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C A N A D I A N  WA R  M U S E U M
Notes on Canadian Units and 
Formations Engaged
Battles of the Somme, March-April 1918 
A R C H E R  F O R T E S C U E  D U G U I D
Introuction by Mark Osborne Humphries
Although the Canadian Corps did not participate directly in the German 
Spring Offensives that began on 21 March 1918, detached Canadian 
cavalry, artillery, and motor machine gun units serving with British 
divisions played important roles at various points in the battles. In one 
of the better known instances, Canadian cavalry were instrumental in 
delaying a German drive on 30 March south of Amiens at Moreuil Wood 
where, in one of the most dramatic cavalry actions of the war, Lieutenant 
Gordon Flowerdew led a mounted charge with sabres drawn. For that 
action, he was awarded a posthumous Victoria Cross.
Little was known about Canadian actions away from the Corps in the 
interwar period and official historian Archer Fortescue Duguid drew up 
a brief narrative for the fifteenth anniversary of those events in the spring 
of 1933. Former Corps Commander Sir Arthur Currie, then principal 
of McGill University, was sent a second draft of that document, dated 
23 March 1933, and after his death it was found amongst his papers. 
These were donated to the Canadian War Museum in 1980. Currie was 
a constant guardian of the reputation of Canadian service men and 
routinely offered comments on the work being produced by the Army 
Historical Section. This case represents a rare instance where Canadian 
actions took centre stage but where Currie had no personal role in or 
knowledge of events.
© Canadian Military History 2018
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By 1933, Duguid’s multi-volume history of the Canadian role in the Great 
War had made little progress. The first and only volume to be published, 
covering the first two-thirds of 1915, was only partially completed and 
would not be published until 1938. Rather than working on narrative 
volumes, much of Duguid’s time was instead spent on drafting mini-
histories such as the document sent to Currie, either in response to 
queries from members of the general public, the British historical 
section, or questions raised in the Canadian House of Commons. While 
Duguid’s account of Canadian actions in 1918 is cursory and sometimes 
inaccurate or incomplete, it is nevertheless a good illustration of both 
the type of work being done by the historical section in the 1930s as well 
as the evolving memory of the war in the interwar period. And it is with 
this in mind (as well as the 100th anniversary of those events this spring) 
that we publish this document in Canadian Military History.
Duguid’s early official account emphasizes the heroism of Flowerdew, 
the determination of Canadian soldiers to hold their ground in the face 
of terrible odds, and the importance of the Canadian contribution to the 
war effort. But is it important to note that Duguid’s eulogistic writing 
style and choice of subject matter were not part of a top-down effort to 
construct a heroic version of the Great War for Canadians. Instead, it 
reflected the preoccupations of ordinary Canadians with the war and 
its meaning. One of the main reasons Duguid made so little progress 
in his series was that the inquiries from regimental associations, 
city counsellors, grieving parents, newspaper reporters, and amateur 
historians were endless and the official historian seemingly tried to 
respond to all of them. Moreover, he felt significant pressure from those 
who wrote to him and his former comrades, like Sir Arthur Currie, to 
“get things right.” What this meant, though, was balancing historical 
accuracy with the need to honour the memory of the fallen and the 
reputations of the living: an impossible task that pulled the Director of 
the Army Historical Section in two directions. Later, after the Second 
World War, Colonel C.P. Stacey, who replaced Duguid in Ottawa, would 
find greater success balancing these two competing aims. So long as 
living legends like Sir Arthur Currie remained influential, Duguid proved 
unable to move beyond summary and into the type of analysis that would 
have forced a choice between history and commemoration.
Le Corps canadien n’a pas participé directement aux batailles durant 
l’offensive du printemps des Allemands qui a commencé le 21 mars 1918, 
mais des unités de cavalerie, d’artillerie et de mitrailleuses du pays 
ayant servi au sein de divisions britanniques ont joué un rôle important 
à différents moments. Dans l’un de ces épisodes les mieux connus, la 
cavalerie canadienne a joué un rôle déterminant en retardant l’avance 
des Allemands, le 30 mars, au sud d’Amiens, au bois de Moreuil. Dans 
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une des charges de cavalerie les plus mémorables de la Première Guerre 
mondiale, le lieutenant Gordon Flowerdew a dirigé ses hommes, armés 
d’épées déployées. Pour cet exploit, la Croix de Victoria lui a été attribuée 
à titre posthume.
On connaissait peu des actions réalisées par les troupes canadiennes 
détachées du Corps pendant l’entre-deux-guerres. L’historien officiel 
Archer Fortescue Duguid a rédigé un court récit des événements au 
printemps 1933, à l’occasion de leur quinzième anniversaire. L’ancien 
commandant du Corps d’armée canadien, sir Arthur Currie, alors 
principal de l’Université McGill, a reçu la deuxième ébauche de ce 
document, datée du 23 mars 1933, laquelle a été retrouvée dans ses 
papiers après sa mort. Ces derniers ont été donnés au Musée canadien 
de la guerre en 1980. Arthur Currie a toujours veillé à préserver la 
réputation des militaires canadiens et a souvent offert des conseils au 
sujet du travail effectué par la Section historique de l’Armée. La bataille 
au bois de Moreuil est l’un des rares épisodes où les Canadiens ont joué 
un rôle déterminant auquel Currie n’a pas participé ou dont il n’était pas 
au courant.
En 1933, l’œuvre de Duguid sur le rôle de Canadiens dans la Grande 
Guerre, qui devait compter de multiples volumes, avait peu progressé. Le 
premier et seul volume à paraître, portant sur les huit premiers mois de 
1915, était en partie terminé; il ne sera publié qu’en 1938. Plutôt que de 
s’attarder aux exposés narratifs, Duguid passait le plus clair de son temps 
à rédiger des mini-récits, comme celui qu’il a envoyé à Currie, en guise 
de réponse à des questions de la part du grand public, des membres de la 
Section de l’histoire britannique, ou encore de la Chambre des communes 
du Canada. Si le récit de Duguid sur les actions des Canadiens en 1918 
est sommaire et parfois inexact ou incomplet, il demeure un bon aperçu 
du type de travail réalisé par la Section historique dans les années 1930 
ainsi que des souvenirs en évolution des conflits durant l’entre-deux-
guerres. C’est dans ce contexte (et celui du centenaire de ces événements 
au printemps) que nous publions le document dans Canadian Military 
History.
Le premier compte-rendu de Duguid met en relief l’héroïsme de Flowerdew, 
la détermination des soldats canadiens à tenir bon en dépit du terrible 
défi à relever, ainsi que l’importance de la contribution des Canadiens à 
l’effort de guerre. Toutefois, il importe de souligner que le style élogieux 
de Duguid et son choix de sujet ne s’inscrivaient pas dans les efforts des 
dirigeants visant à livrer aux Canadiens une version héroïque de la Grande 
Guerre. Au lieu, ces écrits témoignent des préoccupations de citoyens 
ordinaires au sujet de la guerre et de son incidence. L’une des principales 
raisons expliquant le peu de progrès réalisé par Duguid dans son projet 
d’écriture était les demandes qu’il recevait d’associations de régiments, 
de conseillers municipaux, de parents endeuillés, de journalistes et 
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d’historiens amateurs : l’historien officiel en recevait une multitude, et il 
semble avoir tenté de répondre à chacune d’elles. De plus, ne voulant pas 
décevoir les gens qui lui écrivaient, dont ses anciens camarades, comme 
sir Arthur Currie, il voulait relater les événements avec justesse.   Il 
devait donc trouver l’équilibre entre la précision historique et le besoin 
d’honorer la mémoire de ceux qui ont péri ou de préserver la réputation 
des vivants : un objectif inatteignable qui suscita un véritable déchirement 
chez le directeur de la Section historique de l’Armée. Plus tard, après la 
Seconde Guerre mondiale, Colonel C. P. Stacey, qui succéda à Duguid 
à Ottawa, a mieux réussi à concilier ces buts concurrents. Ainsi, aussi 
longtemps que des personnages marquants comme sir Arthur Currie 
ont maintenu leur influence, Duguid a été incapable de délaisser les 
sommaires pour s’adonner aux analyses qui auraient conduit au choix 
entre le récit historique et le récit commémoratif.
The German Offensive of 1918 began with a drive from St. Quentin and Cambrai towards Amiens on a front of 60 miles between 
the Oise and the Sensee; when the battle began on 21st March the 
junction of the French Sixth Army with the British Fifth Army was 
at Barisis, five miles south of the Oise. The British right was held by 
the III Corps (Butler) with the 58th Division south of the river, the 
18th Division opposite La Fere and holding Vendueil, and the 14th 
Division in Moy and opposite Itancourt. Next to the north was the 
XVIII Corps (Maxse) opposite St. Quentin, with the 36th Division 
south of the canal, the 30th a mile east of the town, and the 60th 
holding Fayet and northwards to the opposite Gricourt. Then the 
XIX Corps (Watts) had the 24th Division astride the Omignon from 
Pontru northwards and the 66th in Villeret and Hardicourt. The 
left Corps of the Fifth Army was the VII (Congree) which had two 
divisions in line, the 16th holding Lempire and Epehy, and the 21st 
in Goueaucourt, which marked the junction with the V Corps of 
the Third Army (Byng). In line on the V Corps front were the 47th 
Division holding Villers, and the 63rd holding Rivecourt and the 
point of the salient towards Cambrai; the 17th Division was on the 
left in Flesquieres and astride the Canal du Nord. Thence the IV 
and VI Corps carried the line north of Boussies, Lagincourt and 
Bullecourt to the Sensee at Cheristy, which was the right of the First 
Army (Horne).
The fighting lasted for two weeks, the whole of the Canadian 
Cavalry Brigade was in the battle area for that period, although the 
r.c.h.a. [(Royal Canadian Horse Artillery)] remained detached and as 
part of the divisional artillery of the 24th (British) Division, the XIX 
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Lt. Gordon M. Flowerdew, VC. [Library and Archives Canada PA-006810]
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Corps was employed continuously as field artillery covering the 24th, 
8th and 20th Divisions on the right of that Corps throughout the 
fighting until 4th April. The rest of the Brigade, which formed part 
of the 3rd Cavalry Division (Harman) and was in the Ennemain-
Devise area (6 miles south of Peronne) received at 5.20 a.m. on 
the morning of the attack, the prearranged message “Concentrate 
South”; subsequent orders diverted its movements eastwards to 
Beaumont to support the III Corps in the area between Chauny and 
Ham. There it furnished a dismounted battalion 800 strong which, 
brigaded with two similar battalions of the 3rd Cavalry Division, 
reinforced the British and subsequently the French infantry on the 
front immediately north of the Oise, and it also supplied from 23rd 
to 27th March a mounted party of 200 men which, with 300 from the 
6th and 7th Cavalry Brigades, formed part of Harman’s Detachment 
and operated in the same Corps area covering the withdrawal of the 
British infantry in front of the Guiscard and of the French infantry in 
front of the Lassioy. On the 27th as the Brigade was reformed at Arsy 
near Compiegne whence it moved towards Montdidier in anticipation 
of a break through; on the 29th March and 1st April it was engaged 
north of Moreuil.
The order for the Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade 
[(c.m.m.g.)] (“A” and “B” Batteries each with 8 guns in 4 armoured 
cards) and the attached Borden, Eaton and Yukon Motor Machine 
Gun Batteries (“C”, “D” and “E” Batteries each with 8 Vickers guns 
carried in light box cars) to proceed as a group from the Canadian 
Corps on the Vimy front to Amiens and to report to Fifth Army, 
was received on the afternoon of 22nd March. The Brigade moved 
during the night via St. Pol and Frevent to Amiens and thence to 
Headquarters, Fifth Army at Villers-Bretonneux which was reached 
at 4 p.m. on the 23rd. Units were immediately detailed; the Eaton 
and Yukon Batteries to report to XVIII Corps at Roye, “B” and 
Borden Batteries to report to VII Corps at Corbie, “A” Battery to 
remain in reserve. The batteries fought a continuous rearguard action 
east of the Somme assisting the hard-pressed infantry, filling critical 
gaps in the line and patrolling roads in the area Ham-Clery-Villers-
Bretonneux from 24th March to 4th April. The Brigade rejoined the 
Canadian Corps at Verdrel on 10th April.
6
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21st march
Under cover of an intense bombardment by artillery and trench 
mortars, and favoured by a heavy white mist, the Germans attacked 
in great strength and with confident determination early on the 21st 
March; by nightfall they had reached the Crozat Canal on the front 
of the III Corps and had pushed the right of the XVIII Corps across 
the St. Quentin canal and to the west of Savy and Holnon. Further 
north on the fronts of the XIX, VII, V, IV and VI Corps, the British 
line, in spite of the most desperate resistance was everywhere forced 
back distances varying from half a mile to nearly three miles. 
When the attack began the two batteries of the r.c.h.a. Brigade 
were in action between Vendelles and Massiemy covering the right 
front. Early in the morning teams went up to bring out the forward 
guns, that of “A” was successfully withdrawn, but the crew of “B”s 
gun having been reduced to two it was found impossible to run it 
out of the emplacement, so the breech block was brought out. On 
this front the enemy delivered repeated and heavy attacks down the 
Omignon; Massiemy fell at noon on the first day but during the 
afternoon and night no further penetration was made and his troops 
suffered heavily in the valley. Late in the afternoon the two batteries 
moved back to prepared positions east of Poeuilly. 
After consultation with his Corps Commanders on the evening 
of the 21st, General Gough decided that as his army was not strong 
enough to stop an attack of such weight and numbers he ought not to 
commit himself to a decisive battle where it stood, but he must keep 
an unbroken line by gradually yielding to the pressure until sufficient 
reinforcements could arrive to stabilize the defence.
22nd march 
The German attack was continued on the 22nd. The position along 
the Crozat Canal was maintained by the III Corps but, on account 
of the exhaustion and heavy losses of the infantry, was abandoned 
during the night across the whole XVIII Corps front to the line of the 
Somme. On the fronts of the XIX, VII and V Corps the British line, 
on the morning of the 23rd, ran east of Monchy-Lagache, Vraignes, 
Buire, Aizecourt, Nurlu and through Fins on the Army boundary to 
Havrincourt.
7
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The r.c.h.a. batteries moved back from their positions east of Poeuilly 
when the infantry of the 24th Division, after repelling all assaults during 
the forenoon, were ordered to withdraw through the 50th Division which 
was on the rear zone position three miles further back. They came 
into action again between Mons and Devise, and at 6 p.m, assisted 
in counter attacks against Coulaincourt which the enemy eventually 
captured. During the night, while the 50th Division was withdrawing 
from the rear zone, they moved to new positions and by daylight were in 
action between Ennemain and Falvy, covering the right.
23rd march 
On the southern front, where divisions of the French V Corps (Pellé) 
were now taking over from III Corps, the enemy crossed the Crozat 
Canal and gained about three miles during the day.
The dismounted battalion of the Canadian Cavalry which had 
been detailed as reserve to the 54th Brigade, 18th Division, on the 
22nd, was held in Bois de Genlis. At 8.30 a.m. on the 23rd, the r.c.d. 
[(Royal Canadian Dragoons)] took up a position at the Railway 
Triangle north of Friéres and covered the infantry withdrawal from 
Menessis; the battalion was in action near Friéres and Fallouel in 
the afternoon, keeping the line continuous as the front, outflanked 
on the left, fell back to, and latter through Bois de Genlis. At 6 
p.m. the Canadian cavalry battalion passed through the French 
line at Villerquier Aumont and spent the night 23rd/24th at Bois de 
Caumont. On the XVIII Corps front Cugny, Golancourt and Ham 
were lost; the whole of the XIX Corps was withdrawn across the 
Somme, and some 15 villages and also Peronne were abandoned to 
the enemy.
The r.c.h.a. occupied two positions this day, the first to the south 
of Ennemain, the second east of Morchain. Further north the enemy 
also advanced crossed the Tortille and forced the VII Corps back on 
Clery and Bouchavesnes.
24th march 
On the allied right where relief of British by reserve troops of the 
French Third Army (Plumbert) was in progress the Germans took 
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Chauny and Guiscard, near the latter place the mounted party of the 
Canadian Cavalry Brigade was in action, steadying the infantry line 
in the gradual withdrawal from Cucny, Beaumont and Villeselves 
towards Berlancourt. The dismounted battalion was at Caillouel in 
reserve under the V French Corps.
From 7 a.m. to 7 p.m. “A” and “B” Batteries, r.c.h.a. barraged 
the line Bethencourt-Parony to prevent the enemy from crossing the 
Somme. Then after the enemy captured Morchain at about 5 p.m. the 
batteries moved in the middle of the night to positions in the open 
between Pertain and Omiecourt.  There was little water, ammunition 
was difficult to obtain, buffer springs were giving trouble and the 
horses had not been off-saddled for a long time.
On the front of the XVIII and right of the XIX corps the 
enemy attacked and captured Esmery-Hallon-Hombleux, Mesnil and 
Bethencourt; in this area the Eaton and Yukon m.m.g. Batteries were 
engaged. Four of the Yukon guns with the 20th Division, in position 
east of Hombleux Cemetery, had excellent targets, particularly on 
enemy advancing in column down the Ham-Nesle Road and only 
after 4 p.m., by which time the enemy was at 300 yards on both 
flanks. [Then] the three remaining guns [were] brought back to cover 
the Bacquencourt bridge over the canal at Breuil. The Eaton Battery 
was detailed to support a counter attack by the 183rd Infantry Brigade 
(61st Division) against Bethencourt but by the time the plateau east 
of the village was reached the Germans were already advancing in a 
steady flow and had also effected [sic] a crossing at Pargny. Defensive 
positions were taken up and held until fifty per cent of the gunners 
were casualties and ammunition was running low; then the infantry 
having withdrawn n.w. and s.w. and there being consequently a gap 
of some 3,000 yards at the junction of the XVIII and XIX Corps, the 
guns were brought into action to hold the line, first near the woods 
east of Dreslincourt, and later, in an old trench n.w. of that village, 
until dark when they fell back 2,000 yards to cover the new line of 
the 24th Division, XIX Corps, east of Hyencourt le Petit and across 
the gap.
While the Eaton and Yukon batteries were holding up the enemy’s 
advance north and south of Nesle, “A” Battery, 1st c.m.m.g. Brigade, 
sent forward from Villers-Bretonneux to the centre of the XIX Corps, 
and with it eight guns mounted in four armoured cars, reported at 
Marcheleport to the 24th Infantry Brigade, 8th Division, which was 
then being hard pressed. From 5 to 8 p.m. the cars co-operated on 
9
Duguid: Notes on Canadian Units and Formations Engaged
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2018
10 Notes on Canadian Units and Formations Engaged
the roads leading to Cizancourt, Licourt and Epenancourt with the 
Sherwood Foresters; the battery fired 8,000 rounds and succeeded 
in holding up the enemy, who on one occasion used hand grenades 
against the foremost car.
On the left of the XIX Corps the enemy did not cross the Somme; 
north of the river on the VII Corps front “B” and Borden m.m.g. 
Batteries checked the thrust down the Somme valley at Clery and 
Ham; further north on the Third Army front the Germans were in 
Longueval, Bazentin and Courcelette. At 2 a.m. on the 24th “B” 
Battery and Borden Battery moved from VII Corps Headquarters 
at Corbie to come under the orders of the 21st Division at Maricourt 
and from there, after congested roads had delayed the four armoured 
cars of the “B” and the light box cars of the Borden Battery, were 
directed towards Clery sur Somme where they arrived at about 8 
a.m. Two Guns of the Borden Battery came into action in the eastern 
outskirts just as the Germans, under cover of a heavy cloud of smoke, 
overran the village and pressed on towards a small wood on the high 
ground 700 yards to the North East where the other 14 guns were 
in position. After doing good execution one of the two forward guns 
was destroyed in Clery, the other was brought out after a running 
fight with revolvers; the remaining guns were disposed astride the 
Clery-Maricourt road, in a trench which although wide and shallow 
and only 500 yards long, provided some cover. The infantry line 
had fallen back to the Bois de Hem, a mile in rear, but a party of 
100 remained in the forward trench with the machine gunners, who 
were unwilling to give up the advantages offered by good observation 
and an excellent field of fire. Repeated assaults in this trench were 
stopped, and attempts to reduce it by working round the open flanks 
were defeated, but by artillery fire and snipers the garrison was 
depleted and the enemy in the course of the next four hours worked 
up closer and threw hand grenades at the guns. Fortunately, at about 
11:30 a.m. a party of the 15th Cheshire’s (35th Division) came up and 
occupied a wired trench 50 yards in rear, and as the position of the 
four surviving guns was becoming precarious they were moved back 
into it at 2 p.m. Three hours later orders came for the infantry to 
withdraw at 8 p.m. to a line Hem-Maurepas. Long before that hour, 
however a combined assault from front and flank drove the garrison 
out, but not without suffering severe losses from the two remaining 
guns, one of which was put of action during the attack and the 
other, after being fired until the enemy were within 50 yards, was 
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brought back down the Hem road. The crews of the two batteries 
now numbered one n.c.o. and 4 men. The o.c., the Borden Battery, 
the last surviving officer of the little garrison, lost his right arm, and 
the five other officers, including the o.c. of “B” Battery, were killed. 
The determined defence of this position had held up the 1st German 
Division for over eight hours.
25th march 
Early in the morning of the 25th, the mounted party of the Canadian 
Cavalry Brigade went forward to the assistance of the French infantry 
at Chevilly, between Muirancourt and Catigny. The V French Corps 
in the sector immediately north of the Oise during this day fell back 
six miles to a line Pontoise Noyon (exclusive) Lagny (inclusive). 
The dismounted party withdrawn from Caillouel was engaged in the 
area Mondescourt-Appelly, where it formed a line through which the 
French withdrew to their new position south of the Pise. The last 
allied troops to cross the Appilly bridge was a squadron of l.s.h. 
[(Lord Strathcona’s Horse)]
The Eaton and Yukon Batteries [c.m.m.g.] were all day in 
action on the left of the XVIII Corps. Four of the Yukon guns 
and one Eaton were with the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders 
on the northern outskirts of Nesle and from 5.30 a.m. to 8.30 a.m. 
frustrated the enemy’s attempts to sweep through the gap on the 
northern boundary of the Corps; then having covered the infantry 
withdrawal they fell back through Nesle and joined the other guns 
in defense of the new line overlooking the river Ignon between Herly 
and Languevoisin and of the high ground east of Cressy. This line 
in turn was outflanked by Heavy attacks which forced the Canal at 
Breuil, penetrated to Moyencourt and turning northwards, in co-
ordination which continued pressure westwards, force the British line 
back towards Roye. The Eaton and Yukon batteries took a heavy toll 
of the advancing Germans and after covering the gradual retirement 
of the infantry were withdrawn from the line soon after midnight 
when the French II Cavalry corps took over responsibility as far 
north as Hattencourt on the right boundary of the XIX Corps.
In the morning “A” and “B” Batteries, r.c.h.a., having moved 
back from Morchain, were in action between Pertain and Omiecourt; 
shortly before noon they moved south of Chaulnes and after engaging 
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the enemy over open sight, to east of Chaulnes at 6 p.m.; when the 
infantry line fell back later in the evening positions were taken up 
west of Lihons.
On this front “A” Battery, 1st c.m.m.g. Brigade was hotly engaged 
from noon onwards, making good use of the armoured cars along the 
roads particularly near Marchelepot, Gizancourt and Licourt, where 
one car, after all its occupants, including the battery commander, had 
been killed at short range, fell into the hands of the enemy.
The British line at nightfall met the Somme at Frise and followed 
it for four miles along the exposed left flank of the XIX Corps to 
the eastern outskirts of Bray, whence the Third Army, which now 
included the VII Corps, carried the line east of Meault, west of Albert 
up the Ancre to Beaumont-Hamel and thence through Hebuterne and 
Bucquoy.
26th march 
On the French Front the Germans captured Roye and Lassigny; on 
the XIX Corps front they pushed on through Fouquescourt, Lihons 
and Cappy.
[The Canadian Cavalry Brigade] mounted detachment (Harman’s) 
in action between Lagny and Evricourt, Chateau des Essarts.
The Eaton and Yukon Batteries [c.m.m.g.] covered the supposed 
junction of the French and British forces near Fouquescourt and 
Bouvroy.
The r.c.h.a. was in action east of Vrely covering the 24th British 
Division which was not in tough with the French on the right, where 
a wide gap across the Amiens-Roye road was reported. The left of 
the XIX Corps was in Proyart but the flank along the Somme was 
exposed for five miles as far as Sailly le Lec, whence the line of VII 
Corps ran north westwards to the Ancre at Mericourt and thence 
up that river. Because of the situation on the battlefront and the 
exhausted condition of the troops, it had been decided that a rear line 
should be prepared and occupied across the front of the Fifth Army; 
the line chosen was that known as the Amiens Defence Line running 
cast of Demuin, through Aubercourt, and by Marcelcave, Lamotte 
and Hamel to Bouzencourt on the Somme. This line was manned on 
the 26th by some 2,000 troops of all sorts from various units of the 
Fifth Army and in it were mounted 14 machine guns of the Canadian 
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Motor Machine Gun Brigade. This body of troops, holding eight 
miles of the line was designated Cary’s Force.
27th march
The German thrust eastwards from Roye reached Montdidier and 
nearly drove a wedge between the British and French. The Eaton 
and Yukon Batteries [c.m.m.g.] were active all day in the area 
Guerbigny, Bouchoir and Rouvroy and the enemy, beyond capturing 
these villages, met with little success on the British right.
The r.c.h.a. batteries were in action west of Vrely firing to 
prevent the enemy from entering Rosieres and to check his advance 
from Meharicourt. On the XIX Corps left Proyart was lost, but at 
Cerisy, where “A” Battery, c.m.m.g. Brigade was in action, and in 
three hours fired 15,000 rounds, the enemy failed to cross the Somme 
until 4 p.m. After that hour the armoured cars engaged the enemy 
in large numbers between Cerisy and Hamel; they inflicted severe 
casualties and checked the advance until darkness.
28th march
Both parties of the Canadian Cavalry Brigade, withdrawn and now 
transferred from the 3rd to the 2nd Cavalry Division, moved towards 
Compiegne and on the morning of the 18th the reunited Brigade (less 
r.c.h.a.) moved from Arsy, by way of Montigny and Moranvillers to 
Welles five miles south west of Montdidier. A detachment of 10 l.s.h. 
under Lieut. Harvey, recaptured Fontaine and handed it over to 
the French. Further north on the frontage of the new Groupement 
Mesple, the villages of Contorie, Plessier and Hancest all passed into 
German hands; on the British front Marcelcave Lamotte, Cerisy and 
Sailly-Laurette also fell.
The r.c.h.a. occupied three positions, west of Vrely, east of 
Beaucourt and beside the Roye road south of Demuin; they covered 
the withdrawal of the infantry and repeatedly engaged the enemy 
advancing in close formation. In their last position they were in 
support of the 133rd French Division which came into line south of 
the Luce. 
13
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Two of the [c.m.m.g.] armoured cars were engaged all day between 
Vrely and Caix and two on the Amiens-Roye road their mobility 
enabled them to avoid shell fire and to surprise the enemy at medium 
range before he could lie down or deploy.
A detachment (15 officers and 386 other ranks) of the 2nd 
Battalion, c.r.t. [(Canadian Railway Troops)] formed part of the 
Carey’s Force and having acquired 16 Lewis Guns took up a positions 
astride the Villers Bretonneux railway at Card Copse (V.3.a.8h.62.D) 
during night 27th/28th. Owing to withdrawal of infantry from 
Wiencourt and Marcelcave this became part of the British front 
line at about 3 p.m. 28th. During night 28th/29th patrols found 
Marcelcave lightly held by the enemy.
29th march
On the afternoon of the 29th the Canadian Cavalry Brigade marched 
to Ailly-sur-Noye and thence to billets in Goyencourt. The r.c.h.a. 
batteries, owing to a mistaken withdrawal by the French infantry, 
had spent the night full of uncertainty, but by 8 a.m. the line was 
reoccupied and at 10 a.m. the enemy advanced and the line fell back. 
Soon after noon the batteries were ordered to take up positions two 
miles in rear and to cover the 20th Division. On the front between 
the Luce and the Somme the Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade 
had 32 guns in action with Carey’s Force in the Amiens Defence Line, 
some of them manned by British gunners; ten of these guns were on 
the high ground above Aubercourt to cover the Luce valley and 
approaches to Demuin; ten were just west of Marcelcave and three 
groups of 4 guns were east of Villers Bretonneux south of Hamel and 
east of Hamel. The Germans gains on this day included Pierrepont 
and Haricourt, Merirres and Villers aux Erables, all on the French 
front, and on the British front Ignacourt was taken. During the night 
the enemy established a footing in Moreuil Wood.
The 2nd Battalion, c.r.t. held position and on night 29th/30th 
sent patrols 1,000 yards forward and towards Marcelcave in which 
the enemy was now established. Between the 21st and the 30th 
March the Germans made an advance of 25 miles towards Amiens 
and had now reached the edge of the plateau overlooking the valley 
of the Avre, known as Moreuil Ridge, and situated some ten miles 
east of Amiens. This dominating position extends for some fifteen 
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miles along the cast bank of the river Avre, and from the northern 
extremity observation may be obtained to the eastward over the main 
line of the Paris-Amiens railway, less than four miles distant, thus 
making close artillery fire possibly. Together with the various other 
railways countering on Amiens this line constituted a vital link in the 
allied lateral communications; if it were overrun or destroyed it was 
reasonable to assume that the French would fall back towards Paris 
and the British upon the Channel ports, with the German forces 
thrusting forward between, and the separation of the French and 
British armies must inevitably follow. To accomplish such a developed 
was one of the main objects of the German strategic plan, and its 
successful achievement might well have had fatal consequences.
The Fifth Army, bearing the brunt of the German onslaught 
made by 64 divisions, a number considerably greater than the entire 
British Army in France,* had been fighting incessantly since the 21st 
March, and on the 30th March, when new grave danger threatened by 
the penetration of the enemy on the Moreuil Ridge, only disorganized 
and greatly depleted elements remained. The command of the British 
right had been taken over by General Sir Henry Rawlinson, who was 
engaged in forming a new Fourth Army out of the survivors of the 
Fifth Army and such troops as could be made available from other 
sectors of the British line. In the meantime the French had assumed 
responsibility for the front south of the Somme, with general control 
of British troops operating in that area, but the French divisions had 
not yet established a continuous line on this part of the front and 
there was a gap of some two miles north of Moreuil in which were 
only a light screen of newly arrived French infantry who had been 
driven out of the wood and on their left exhausted units of the 8th 
and 20th Divisions.
30th march
At 5 a.m. orders were received for [r.c.h.a.] batteries to move to 
positions north of the Luce between Domart and Hangard to cover 
infantry in line from Memuin to n.e. corner of Moreuil Wood. 
Barrage was laid down on e. edge of Rifle Wood as our infantry were 
*   Despatch of Sir Douglas Haig dated 20th July, 1918.
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falling back. At 6.30 p.m. barrage was fired to cover the successful 
counter attack which regained Rifle Wood. 
Shortly after 7 a.m. on 30th March, the XIX Corps sent the 
following instructions by telephone to the 2nd Cavalry Division: 
“Enemy reported in large wood n.e. of Moreuil on right flank of 20th 
Division. Cross river Avre at once and move s.e. across the river Luce 
and clear up the whole situation in the wood and secure the line as far 
as Moreuil.”
The 3rd Cavalry Brigade and the Canadian Cavalry Brigade were 
nearest the objective named, and Major General T.T. Pitman 
commanding the 2nd Cavalry Division at once motored to the 3rd 
Brigade Headquarters at Cottenchy; at 7.30 a.m. he ordered that 
brigade to cross the river Noye at Fouencamps as rapidly as possible, 
to seize the high ground north of Moreuil Wood, then, working 
with the Canadian Cavalry Brigade, to restore the situation up to 
the line of the Moreuil-Demuin road; the distances to be covered 
was about eight miles and whichever brigade arrived first was to 
go straight for the high ground. General Pitman then motored to 
Guyencourt headquarters of the Canadian Cavalry Brigade, saw 
Brigadier-General J.E.B. Seely, whose brigade was saddled up and 
ready to move, and ordered him to cross the Avre via Remiencourt 
and Castel, seize the high ground and work in conjunction with the 
3rd Cavalry Brigade. Time and obscurity prevented the elaboration 
of details; the first brigade–whether the 3rd or the Canadian–to 
arrive on the ground was to act on its own initiative according to 
circumstances, closely supported by the second.
Brigadier-General Seely galloped off ahead of his brigade to 
Castel, where he found the General Commanding the 133rd French 
Division, which was disposed on the front between Moreuil and the 
Luce at Demuin, but not in possession of Moreuil Wood and Ridge in 
the centre, and arranged with him to send instructions to the French 
troops, then under orders to withdraw from Moreuil, to hold on at all 
costs. General Seely, still in front of his brigade, crossed the Avre at 
the gallop with his headquarters party, and halted at the front line of 
infantry 600 yards east of the brigade only long enough to send back 
concise verbal orders for the employment of squadrons to carry out 
his plan for the capture of the ridge. Now under fire from the small 
parties of Germans, who from the edge of the wood could see them 
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emerge from the morning mist still heavy in the valley, they dashed 
up the grassy slope to establish headquarters at the southwestern 
corner of the Bois de Ballon, the semi-detached north-west portion of 
the wood not yet occupied in strength by the enemy. The gallopers 
met their oncoming regiments as they formed line of troops columns 
on clearing the bridge; as each squadron received orders it broke away 
at an increased pace. Now it was about 9 o’clock, and the 4th Hussars 
and the 5th and 16th Lancers of the 3rd Brigade were on their heels 
as they crossed the Avre. 
The orders for the attack were: the Royal Canadian Dragoons, 
the leading regiment, to send the foremost squadron (Capt. R. 
Nordheimer) at a gallop to clear the north-western corner of the Bois 
de Moreuil; the second squadron (Capt. T. Newcomen) to proceed 
mounted to the south-western face of the wood, to occupy the 
southern point and gain touch with the French presumed to be still 
in possession of Moreuil; the third Squadron (Major R.S. Timmis) to 
gallop to the north-east corner of the wood and endeavour to join up 
with the second squadron. Lord Strathcona’s Horse, following close 
behind the Dragoons were to develop the attack; one squadron (Lieut. 
G.M. Flowerdew) to move round the north-eastern corner at a gallop 
to engage any reinforcements which might be entering the wood, and 
then to occupy the eastern face; the remaining squadrons (Capt. 
J.B. Trotter and Lieut. A.D. Morgan under the general command of 
Lieutenant-Colonel D.J. Macdonald) were to press the main attack, 
dismounted, southeastwards through the wood.
The leading squadron of the Dragoons, although exposed to 
heavy rifle and machine gun fire, engaged the first line of the enemy 
in hand-to-hand combat. Having cut their way through and sent back 
the horses, the squadron penetrated into the heart of the wood and 
there broke through the second German line.
The second squadron worked south-eastwards across the open 
slope to about half way along the western face where it came under 
heavy machine gun and rifle fire from the enemy in the wood and in 
Moreuil. It then took up a line running south-westwards with the left 
flank in the wood, and maintained itself there throughout the day.
The third squadron followed the first, galloping eastwards in line 
of troop columns and about 500 yards distant from the northern edge 
of the wood; before the north-east corner was reached it came under 
such heavy machine gun fire from the wood that the signal “line to 
the right” was given and the squadron charged. After engaging the 
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enemy hand-to-hand for a time, first in the open and then among the 
beech trees, only the squadron commander and some 30 of his men 
remained mounted; these he collected and, leaving the dismounted 
men to continue the action, he emerged from the wood with the 
intention of completing his mission, but this was carried out by the 
Strathconas who now appeared on the field.
While moving at the trot up the deep draw 1,000 yards north 
of the wood, Lieutenant Flowerdew, at the head of the lending 
squadron of the Strathconas, detached one troop under Lieutenant 
F.M.W. Harvey, v.c. as vanguard in anticipation of mounted action. 
But on reaching the plateau the patrols could see that the enemy’s 
position extended north-eastwards outside the wood; two lines of 
infantry each about 60 strong and two hundred yards apart, with 
machine guns posted both in the centre and on the flanks. Flowerdew 
therefore ordered Harvey to take the Hotchkiss guns, and to attack 
with his troop dismounted through the north-eastern corner while 
he himself led the remaining three troops to the charge against the 
position outside the wood. On the sudden appearance of the squadron 
Charge of Flowerdew’s Squadron by Sir Alfred James Munnings. [Beaverbrook Collection of War 
Art, CWM 19710261-0443]
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the enemy in front opened fire; machine guns, trench mortars on the 
left flank and a 6-inch howitzer about 600 yards in the rear joined in 
the attempt to stop the advance; burling a shower of bombs the front 
line ran to meet the attack with the bayonet and showed no signs 
of surrender when the horsemen charged home. Many of the enemy 
were killed with the sword as the squadron passed through both lines, 
and wheeled about, and charged again. After the second collision the 
few surviving Germans broke and fled; ten minutes after the action 
began the fifteen remaining Strathconas were making their way into 
the wood at the centre of the eastern face, where they established 
themselves, and later joined up with the dismounted troops and some 
of the leading squadron of the Dragoons. Lieutenant Flowerdew died 
of wounds received in this action; he was awarded a posthumous 
Victoria Cross.
The dismounted parties had likewise to overcome the most 
determined resistance; there was fierce hand-to-hand fighting in all 
the northern portion of the wood, resulting ultimately in the complete 
capture of that section and the killing of most of the German garrison. 
The two Strathcona squadrons in the dismounted attack suffered 
Dead horses from Flowerdew’s charge. Still from Ministry of Information film ‘German 
Offensive 4.’ [© IWM]
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severely; the first to be engaged (Trotter) followed Nordheimer’s 
squadron of the Dragoons into the wood as the north-west corner 
and fought their way eastwards, the second (Morgan) proceeded 
mounted to near the point where Timmis’ squadron of the Dragoons 
had charged, and there dismounted, entered the wood and advanced 
southwards. Both were aided by the derangement caused by the 
simultaneous attacks of Newcomen and Flowerdew on the enemy’s 
flank and rear; after a line had been established westwards across 
the wood, Trotter was withdrawn into close support and Morgan then 
joined up on the right of Harvey and Nordheimer on the eastern face. 
Here the Hotchkiss guns were brought into action and drove away 
the crew of the 6-inch howitzer and a detachment of the Machine 
Gun Squadron, which mounted their Vickers on the eastern face, 
frustrated repeated attempts of the enemy to manhandle it out of 
range. Meanwhile the second squadron of Dragoons continued to be 
held up half way down the western face of the wood by the enemy 
who was being strongly reinforced in the southern part of the wood 
and who was still fighting in the centre.
The 3rd Cavalry Brigade had crossed the river at 9.30 a.m., and 
in accordance with the orders of the Divisional Commander acted as 
support to the Canadian Brigade. A squadron of the 4th Hussars was 
sent down to the western edge of the wood to secure the right flank 
of the Canadians; it endeavoured to push through the southern part 
of the wood and up the Moreuil-Demuin road, but accurate close-
range machine gun fire compelled a withdrawal to the right of the 
line held by Newcomen’s squadron. The remaining two squadrons of 
the Hussars worked their way along the western slopes of the ridge 
between Moreuil and the wood.
Also at about 9.30 a.m. “D” Battery, r.h.a. [(Royal Horse 
Artillery)] came into action in the open on the high ground with six 
guns, and fired on selected points on information sent back by the 
squadrons from the eastern face. An hour later, when the Germans 
made some progress down the southern side of the Luce valley, one 
section moved to Hailles to cover a retirement, if necessary, and 
another took up a position southwest of Castel to enfilade the 
German position n.e. and e. of Moreuil. The four Vickers guns of the 
two armoured cars of “A” Battery, c.m.m.g. Brigade, detailed to co-
operate with the Canadian Cavalry Brigade, were placed in position 
at Castel to command the Avre valley, the railway track and the road 
bridge, and remained there all day but had not targets.
20
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At the beginning of the action the Fort Garry Horse had been 
detailed as Brigade Reserve. Before noon two of the squadrons (Capt. 
F.F. Thomson and Capt. R.W. Allen) were dismounted and sent south-
eastwards through the wood to reinforce Newcomen’s squadron of 
Dragoons on the western face and to extend its line through the wood. 
The third squadron (Capt. R.G. Hutchison) was sent back across the 
river to enfilade the enemy from the high ground west of Moreuil.
By 11 a.m. the Canadian Cavalry Brigade, reinforced by the 4th 
Hussars, had established themselves on three sides of the wood; but the 
centre and southern portions were still full of the enemy, and further 
reinforcements consisting of the 5th and 16th Lancers, were sent by the 
3rd Cavalry Brigade to the assistance of the Canadians. The g.o.c., 
Canadian Cavalry Brigade, has stated that without this timely aid the 
Canadians could not have held on to their hard-won position.
With the Canadian units already engaged and these additional troops, 
together with about 100 infantrymen (2nd West Yorkshire Regiment), a 
concerted advance was organized which drove southwards through the 
wood at about 3 p.m. and resulted in a continuous line facing south 
across it and connecting with the position on the eastern face.
By this time the Headquarters of the Canadian Cavalry Brigade 
had been moved forward to the northern face of the wood, and the 
lead horses to the open ground north of it. A circus of red German 
aeroplanes flew low over the horses and before the order to move 
to a flank could be carried out the enemy artillery placed a heavy 
concentration on them and inflicted severe casualties. 
Fighting continued throughout the rest of the day; under cover of 
heavy shell fire the enemy made several counter attacks, one of which 
caused a withdrawal of the right of the line in the wood for a short 
distance; but the enemy eventually gave up hope of regaining his lost 
position that day; as night fell his artillery fire increased in intensity 
and for two or three hours he poured gas shells into the wood. By 
2.30 a.m. on the 31st the two cavalry brigades had been relieved by 
the infantry of the 8th British Division, and the Canadian Cavalry 
Brigade withdrew to Bois de Sencat.
The losses of the Canadian Cavalry Brigade in the section of 
Moreuil Wood have not been precisely ascertained as the official 
figures cover also the later fighting at Rifle Wood. It is recorded, 
however, that about 300 officers and men were killed and wounded.  
Throughout this action nothing was more remarkable than the 
extraordinary bitterness of the fighting. The German morale had 
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been raised to the highest pitch by the successes of the past ten days, 
and although, according to a German source, “There were many 
young soldiers in the ranks who on this day were taking part in their 
first action” even the spectacle of charging horseman caused neither 
terror nor dismay; Canadian participants state that the enemy 
ran forward with the bayonet to meet them, and that desperately 
wounded Germans refused to be picked up by stretcher-bearers, and 
even seized rifles with intent to shoot their would-be rescuers. On the 
other hand, the enemy has paid tribute to the corresponding valour 
of the Canadians; in an account of the action published in 1927 in the 
“Militär Wochemblatt”, a German officer who was present tells of the 
mounted attacks being met with a “murderous fire”; and of troopers, 
on foot refusing to surrender when their horses were shot, fighting 
it out in isolated groups to the bitter end. Not a man surrendered 
throughout the whole action and no unwounded prisoners were taken 
on either side.
During the day the enemy advanced along south bank of Luce 
river and occupied Demuin. Ten guns of the c.m.m.g. Brigade (four 
of them manned by British gunners) on the high ground north of the 
Luce, overlooking Aubercourt and Demuin enfiladed the advance and 
had excellent targets. Four other c.m.m.g. Brigade guns on the left 
covered north and east. When the infantry were ordered back these 
guns were withdrawn from the salient to the new line 1,000 yards 
in rear and south of the wood east of the Bois de Hangard. Four 
armoured cars were also operating, two of them with the Canadian 
Cavalry Brigade, but did not come into action.  
At 11 a.m. heavy enemy bombardment and withdrawal of line 
on both flanks caused [2nd Battalion c.r.t.’s] withdrawal from front 
line trench to support line. Forward positions were reoccupied in 
early p.m. Later heavy toll was taken of enemy infantry advancing 
to attack south westwards from Marcelcave; position held until relief 
(by 25th Australian Battalion) at 4.30 a.m. 31st.
31st March.  
At 2.30 a.m. 31st March, the Cavalry in Moreuil Wood were relieved 
by the 6th Division and the Canadian Cavalry Brigade withdrew to 
the Bois de Seneat.
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At 3 a.m. orders were received for [r.c.h.a.] batteries to move to 
positions in valley south east of Hailles covering infantry along east 
edge of Moreuil Wood. Many French 75 batteries were now in action.
Our troops were driven back to Hangard. [Canadian Motor Machine 
Gun] armoured cars were in operation between Hangard and Domart. 
During the night of the 31st March/1st April the Borden Battery moved 
from reserve at Hobecourt to relieve Eaton Battery in line.
1st April 
By the 1st April Moreuil Wood, except for Balloon Wood at the 
north-western corner was again in possession of the enemy, and Rifle 
Wood, 1,500 yards to the north east, had also been occupied. A 
counter attack on the afternoon of the 31st by a British Infantry 
Brigade to recover the latter feature had been unsuccessful, and the 
allied front line was now at Hourges. To restore the situation the 
[Canadian Cavalry Brigade], though very tired, were called upon 
once more.
At 9.20 p.m. 31st March, the following order was issued by the 
XIX Corps to the 2nd Cavalry Division, to which the Canadian 
Cavalry Brigade was still attached:
“2nd Cavalry Division will establish tomorrow morning the line C.15 
Central C.16 Control – to point 104 in C.11.d, thence north of Hangard 
exclusive.”
This was a line embracing Rifle Wood, and including the steep-sided 
valley to the south west and the higher ground 500 yards to the east.
Rifle Wood is about 900 yards long by 80 yards wide, on the 
same escarpment as Moreuil Wood; it was occupied by two German 
Infantry battalions and another was in reserve, but this was not 
known at the time. The conference of Brigadiers with the Divisional 
Commander took place late at night and it being impossible, therefore, 
to carry out any reconnaissance, plans had to be worked out by map. 
Brigadier General Seely was given command of all troops detailed for 
the operation. These were:
Two regiments, 4th Cavalry Brigade. (3rd Hussars 1/1st Oxford 
Hussars) 
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One Regiment, 5th Cavalry Brigade. (20th Hussars) 
Canadian Cavalry Brigade. 
Three Batteries r.h.a. 
Four Machine Gun Squadrons. 
Reserve: Two Regiments 5th Cavalry Brigade, (2nd Dragoons 
(r.s.g. [(Royal Scots Greys)]) and 12th Lancers.)
It was arranged that the Artillery of the 29th (French) Division 
should co-operate with the Artillery of XIX Corps in laying down a 
preliminary 35 minutes bombardment on the area to be attacked. The 
machine gun squadrons were also employed to lay down a barrage. 
Owing to the difficulty of getting horses across the single 
available bridge over the river Luce it was decided to make the attack 
dismounted. It was delivered, as planned, in three waves. As 8.55 a.m. 
the first was launched, it consisted of the two regiments of the 4th 
Cavalry Brigade (3rd Hussars, less one squadron, and Oxfordshire 
Hussars), organized as a battalion. These troops quickly seized their 
objective, the Hangard road from the n.e. corner of the wood to a T. 
road about 900 yards north leading to Demuin.
The second wave consisted of the 20th Hussars (5th Cavalry 
Brigade). The Hussars seized the north-eastern edge of the wood 
border in the main Amiens-Roye road, established themselves in the 
wood, and prepared two strong points. 
The enemy troops dislodged by the two attacks sought refuge in 
the heart of the wood.
The third wave consisted of the Canadian Cavalry Brigade, 
under the command of Lieut. Colonel Paterson, with the Fort Garry 
Horse, Lord Strathcona’s Horse and the Royal Canadian Dragoons 
in the order given, the whole consisting of 12 officers and 476 other 
ranks. The Brigade was to assemble in the marshy bottom bordering 
the Luce, and to pass through the second wave and establish itself 
round the perimeter of the wood. On entering the wood, the Fort 
Garry Horse were to swing to the left and Lord Strathcona’s Horse 
were to swing to the right. The Royal Canadian Dragoons were held 
in reserve to reinforce where necessary. Much fierce fighting followed 
though the enemy were less stubborn than at Moreuil Wood. The 
Canadians fought their way through the wood and established a line 
along the eastern, southern and western faces.
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A platoon of the 20th Hussars and a platoon of the 12th Lancers 
were sent up as reinforcements, followed shortly afterwards by the 
6th Dragoon Guards (Carabiniers) which prior to the action had been 
holding a position west of the wood and now took over responsibility 
for the eastern face.
About 9.45 a.m. while the struggle for possession of the wood was 
still in progress, the Royal Scots Greys, from the reserve, advanced 
southwards in the open and under heavy shell and machine gun fire 
established a line joining up with the Canadian right at the western 
face of the wood.
One hour later, the 12th Lancers (less the platoon already in 
the line) were sent forward and occupied the line vacated by the 6th 
Dragoon Guards 1,000 yards west of the wood.
By 11.00 a.m. the entire wood was in possession of the cavalry 
and the position in process of consolidation by the 2nd Field Squadron 
r.e. [(Royal Engineers)], which had followed close on the heels of 
the Canadian Brigade, and 100 infantry of the 59th Brigade, 20th 
British Division. Over 100 prisoners were taken and 13 machine guns, 
the latter being at once turned against the enemy, provided a most 
valuable reinforcement. 
As the enemy were preparing to counter attack, the 6th Inniskilling 
Dragoons from the 7th Cavalry Brigade (3rd Cavalry Division) were 
ordered forward and took over the line along the south-western face 
of the wood. The 7th Dragoon Guards from the same Brigade were 
also sent up later and relieved the Carabiniers. 
Between 11.30 a.m. and 3.00 p.m. the Germans were on several 
occasions seen massing for a counter attack in large numbers and 
were engaged by artillery, machine gun and rifle fire. The counter 
attack was finally delivered by a complete brigade of infantry. It 
was everywhere repulsed and many hundreds of German dead were 
left lying to the east and south of Rifle Wood. A great many of the 
casualties were inflicted by the Artillery which was able to fire with 
direct observation on heavy columns of Germans marching along the 
roads, as many as 2,000 rounds being fire by a single r.h.a. battery. 
On the other hand the enemy artillery, machine guns and trench 
mortar fire directed on the wood all day was severe and caused many 
casualties.
At 6.00 p.m. the Canadian Cavalry Brigade was relieved, and 
relief of the remainder of the cavalry force followed during the night. 
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The [r.c.h.a.] bombardment of last night broke up enemy 
concentrations and no attack was delivered. Between 3.30 and 4.30 
p.m Hailles was shelled heavily by the enemy.
There were no new developments this day [regarding the c.m.m.g.].
2nd april 
At 3 p.m. the [Canadian Cavalry] Brigade marched to bivouac in the 
Bois de Boves and came under orders of the 3rd Cavalry Division. 
The r.c.h.a. batteries were not called upon to fire. This was also a 
quiet day for the c.m.m.g.
3rd april 
The [Canadian Cavalry] Brigade rested where they were complimented 
by General Sir Henry Rawlinson in person.
The r.c.h.a. experienced a very quiet morning. At 4 p.m. the 
batteries moved to positions 1000 yards north of Gentelles to cover 
the 24th Division in reserve line. 
On the night 3rd/4th all Motor Machine Gun batteries were 
relieved and concentrated in reserve at Hobecourt under orders of 
Fourth Army. 
4th april 
On this day the Germans made their final attempt to break through 
the French and British armies. The attack was made with 14 divisions 
on a front of 21 miles southwards from the Somme. There was heavy 
fighting on the British front between the Somme and the Luce. The 
enemy gained some ground but Villers Bretonneux and the high 
ground near it were held.
At 10 a.m. the [Canadian Cavalry] Brigade was ordered to saddle 
up ready to move forward. It was not required, however, and at 6 
p.m. orders were received to off-saddle but to be ready at half hour’s 
notice.
The [r.c.h.a.] batteries moved to positions n.w. of Cachy, being 
transferred from 24th d.a. [(Divisional Artillery)] to 50th d.a.
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At 3 p.m. the c.m.m.g. Bde. was ordered to check the enemy’s 
advance and hold Villers Bretonneux at all costs. “A”, “B”, “D”, “E” 
Batteries were in action in the neighbourhood of Villers Bretonneux. 
Armoured cars were also in action. Many casualties were inflicted on 
the enemy. 
5th april. 
In the forenoon the Canadian Cavalry Brigade marched to billets at 
Camon. On this day “A” Battery r.c.h.a. had three guns in action. 
“B” Battery had one. The c.m.m.g. Brigade held positions in front 
of and to the left of Villers Bretonneux.
◆     ◆     ◆     ◆
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